DRAFT 0.2. Not yet approved. Policy OID 1.3.6.1.4.1.48431.1.1.1. Markdown source: netstable-cp-cps.md.

NetStable Certificate Policy and Certification Practice Statement

NetStable Certificate Policy and Certification Practice Statement

Document: NetStable CP/CPS, version 0.2 (DRAFT, not yet in force) Policy document OID: 1.3.6.1.4.1.48431.1.1.1 Owner: NetStable, LLC, Policy Authority (§1.5) Structure: RFC 3647. A combined CP (what must be true) and CPS (how NetStable does it). Where the running PKI does not yet meet a statement, §10 lists the deviation and its fix; nothing in §10 may be silently dropped.

1. Introduction

1.1 Overview

NetStable, LLC operates a private public-key infrastructure (the NetStable PKI) to sign what it ships: container images and their attestations (SBOM, provenance, vulnerability scans), documents (reports, security notices, release and compliance packages), product licences, and RFC 3161 time-stamps. It is not a publicly trusted CA and does not issue TLS server certificates. Relying parties trust it by explicitly installing the NetStable root (§2.2).

1.2 Document name and identification

Item OID
This CP/CPS 1.3.6.1.4.1.48431.1.1.1
Production HSM signer certificates 1.3.6.1.4.1.48431.1.2.1
Operator-issued subscriber certificates 1.3.6.1.4.1.48431.1.2.2
Test / development certificates 1.3.6.1.4.1.48431.1.2.3 (test root only)
TSA policy 1.3.6.1.4.1.48431.1.3.1
Licence-signing EKU 1.3.6.1.4.1.48431.1.4.1

Arc registry: standards/oid-registry.md (IANA PEN 48431).

1.3 PKI participants

1.4 Certificate usage

Allowed Prohibited
Signing container images, attestations, documents, packages, licences, time-stamps; personal document signing and S/MIME TLS server or client authentication; issuing subordinate CAs to anyone but NetStable; any use by a party other than the subscriber

1.5 Policy administration

1.6 Definitions

2. Publication and repository

2.1 Repository

2.2 Publication of trust anchors

The root certificate and its SHA-256 fingerprint are published on the repository, in this document (§7.4), and in every product's documentation. Relying parties must verify the fingerprint through a second channel before installing the root.

2.3 Frequency

CA certificates: at ceremony. CRLs of online issuing CAs: at least every 24 hours and on every revocation. CRLs of the root and intermediate: at least every 6 months (§4.9). Manifest: on change and at least every 6 days. This CP/CPS: on each approved version.

2.4 Access control

Repository content is public read. Only the publishing service identity may write (§5.1).

3. Identification and authentication

3.1 Naming

Subject DNs: C=US, ST=Virginia, L=Woodbridge, O=NetStable, LLC, OU=<function>, CN=<name>. Names are meaningful and unique in the hierarchy. Signer certificates carry the product in the CN (for example "Heliopolis Image Signer v1") and a SAN URI identity https://pki.netstable.io/signers/<name>, which relying parties check. No anonymous or pseudonymous certificates.

3.2 Initial identity validation

3.3 Re-key and 3.4 revocation requests

Re-key uses a new key or key version and a new certificate; identity is re-validated as in §3.2. Revocation may be requested by the subscriber or the Policy Authority; the Operator authenticates the requester through a known channel.

4. Certificate life-cycle

5. Facility, management and operational controls

5.1 Physical and logical environment

CA and signer keys live in Cloud HSM (§6.2). The online CA host is a hardened virtual machine without public web ingress; its APIs are loopback-only. Public services (repository, CRL, OCSP, TSA) run behind a managed load balancer with rate limits. All infrastructure is defined in Terraform and Ansible (terraform/, ansible/).

5.2 Trusted roles and number of persons

Role Duties
Policy Authority approves this CP/CPS, new CAs and signers, ceremonies
Operator runs ceremonies, issues and revokes certificates, maintains services
Auditor reviews logs and ceremony records; must not be the Operator
Witness observes and attests ceremonies; holds no key access

Single-operator exception. NetStable is a single-person organisation. The Policy Authority and Operator roles are held by one person. Multi-person control of CA keys, which industry and federal policies require, is replaced by the following compensating controls, all mandatory:

  1. No standing access to CA keys. The Operator's everyday account holds no signing or destroy permission on any CA key. Access is granted only through a just-in-time Privileged Access Manager (PAM) entitlement, scoped to the one keyring, for at most one hour, with a written justification. Break-glass owner rights sit on a separate account, whose credentials are split: one part held by the Operator, one by an external custodian (for example the company's attorney).
  2. Root and intermediate keys disabled between ceremonies. Their key versions are kept DISABLED and are enabled only inside a ceremony.
  3. Independent notification. Every PAM grant, every use of a CA key outside step-ca, and every IAM change on the PKI projects raises an alert sent to the Operator and to an address outside NetStable's Google Workspace.
  4. Witnessed, recorded ceremonies. Each ceremony follows a written script, is screen- and video-recorded, and is observed (in person or live video) by an external Witness who signs the ceremony record. Recordings and records are kept under a locked retention policy.
  5. Tamper-evident logs, externally reviewed. KMS administrative and data-access logs are written to locked-retention storage; an external Auditor (for example a fractional CISO or accountant) reviews the log summary quarterly and signs off.
  6. Second approver when available. As soon as a second trusted person exists (employee, contractor or advisor), PAM approval for CA keys requires that person's approval; the exception then ends for ceremonies.

This exception is reviewed at every yearly CP/CPS review.

5.3 Personnel

Trusted roles are held only by NetStable's managing member or persons under written agreement with NetStable. No background-check requirement beyond that is imposed.

5.4 Audit logging

Logged: every Cloud KMS administrative and data-access event (including every AsymmetricSign), PAM grants, IAM changes, step-ca issuance and revocation, OCSP and publisher service logs, TSA requests, ceremony actions. Logs are retained for at least two years in locked storage; BigQuery holds an analysable copy. Reviews: automated alerts continuously (§5.2), manual review quarterly.

5.5 Records archival

Ceremony records, HSM attestations, issued CA and signer certificates, CRLs and this CP/CPS's approved versions are archived until three years after the issuing CA expires, under a retention lock.

5.6 Key changeover

Issuing CAs stop issuing at their issuance cut-off (notAfter minus the longest permitted child validity minus 90 days) and are replaced by a new generation created at a ceremony before the cut-off.

5.7 Compromise and disaster recovery

5.8 CA termination

At least 90 days' notice on the repository; final CRLs published with a nextUpdate beyond the last certificate's expiry; repository kept online until then.

6. Technical security controls

6.1 Key generation

All CA and signer keys are generated inside the HSM and are non-exportable. The HSM's attestation for each key is archived (§5.5). Operator-issued subscriber keys are generated by the subscriber.

6.2 Private key protection

6.3 Other aspects of key-pair management: validity and key-use periods

Certificate Validity Key-use period
Root 20 years issues only intermediate certificates and CRLs, at ceremonies
Intermediate 12 years issues issuing-CA certificates and CRLs, at ceremonies
Code, Document, Licensing Issuing CAs 8 years until issuance cut-off (§5.6)
Timestamping Issuing CA 6 years until issuance cut-off
Image and code signers ≤ 13 months same; new key version at each renewal
Document signers ≤ 2 years same
Licence signer ≤ 3 years same
TSA signer certificate ≤ 90 days TSA key used ≤ 15 months, then destroyed
OCSP responder ≤ 7 days same
Operator-issued code-signing leaves ≤ 24 hours same
Operator-issued document / S/MIME ≤ 1 year same

6.4 Activation data

No passwords protect HSM keys; activation is by IAM identity and PAM grant. step-ca provisioner credentials are stored in Secret Manager, readable only by the Operator's privileged role.

6.5 Computer security and 6.6 life-cycle controls

Hosts are built from code (Rocky Linux 9, hardened baseline), patched automatically, with persistent journald and centralised logs. Changes go through Git review and terraform plan before apply.

6.7 Network security

CA APIs listen on loopback only; the CA host has no public web ingress; public services are behind a load balancer with Cloud Armor rate limits.

6.8 Time

CA hosts and the TSA use Google infrastructure time; the TSA continuously cross-checks against NIST time servers (§4).

7. Certificate, CRL and OCSP profiles

7.1 Certificate profile (all)

X.509 v3; serial numbers ≥ 64 bits from a CSPRNG, positive, ≤ 20 octets; ECDSA P-384 with SHA-384 (OCSP responders: P-384 from the rebuild onward); subjectKeyIdentifier per RFC 7093; authorityKeyIdentifier; CRL distribution point and AIA (caIssuers, OCSP) over HTTP.

Certificate basicConstraints keyUsage extendedKeyUsage certificatePolicies
Root CA, (no pathLen) keyCertSign, cRLSign — —
Intermediate CA, pathLen 1 keyCertSign, cRLSign serverAuth†, codeSigning, timeStamping, emailProtection, documentSigning, licensing (.1.4.1) .1.2.1, .1.2.2 + CPS URI
Code Signing Issuing CA CA, pathLen 0 keyCertSign, cRLSign serverAuth†, codeSigning .1.2.1, .1.2.2
Document Signing Issuing CA CA, pathLen 0 keyCertSign, cRLSign serverAuth†, documentSigning (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.36), emailProtection .1.2.1, .1.2.2
Timestamping Issuing CA CA, pathLen 0 keyCertSign, cRLSign serverAuth†, timeStamping .1.2.1
Licensing Issuing CA CA, pathLen 0 keyCertSign, cRLSign 1.3.6.1.4.1.48431.1.4.1 .1.2.1
Signers not CA (critical) digitalSignature (critical) per issuing CA .1.2.1
TSA signer not CA digitalSignature timeStamping only, critical .1.2.1
Operator-issued leaves not CA per template per template .1.2.2

No CA certificate ever carries OCSPSigning or anyExtendedKeyUsage. No policy constraints.

† serverAuth and name constraints. Each online issuing CA runs in step-ca, which serves its API over TLS with a certificate it issues itself from that CA; standard clients reject that certificate unless serverAuth is permitted down the chain. serverAuth therefore appears on the intermediate and the online issuing CAs, and the intermediate carries critical name constraints permitting only DNS:localhost, IP:127.0.0.1/32 and IP:::1/128. No CA under the NetStable intermediate can issue a TLS certificate valid for any real hostname. Signer identities are URIs, which these constraints do not restrict.

Document and advisory files verified with cosign use signers from the Code Signing CA, because cosign requires the codeSigning purpose; the Document Signing CA serves human-facing signatures (PDF, S/MIME).

7.2 CRL profile

X.509 v2 CRLs with CRL number and authority key identifier. Online issuing CAs: nextUpdate 24 hours, regenerated every 16 hours and on revocation. Root and intermediate: nextUpdate ≤ 6 months, re-signed every 3–5 months at a ceremony.

7.3 OCSP profile

RFC 6960; delegated responder certificate per issuing CA with id-pkix-ocsp-nocheck; responses valid ≤ 1 hour for online CAs; unknown serial numbers answered revoked with the extended-revoked extension.

7.4 Trust anchor

Root Status SHA-256 fingerprint
NetStable, LLC Root CA v2 current (2026-09-26 → 2046-09-26) 7b5834c61086dfd79f9402e95579741ff0e3c5f2f3944e3f2453daf1deaf7a83
NetStable, LLC Root CA v1 trusted until retirement (Phase 4) 622540676a092c5aaa95a3ec9f07afdbbd34d640d27ca41c17e80584d2f60d72

8. Compliance audit

Self-assessment against this CP/CPS at least yearly, plus the quarterly external log review (§5.2). No WebTrust or ETSI audit (not required for a private PKI). Findings go to operations/drift.md.

Certificates are issued at no charge and only for NetStable's own products and people. NetStable provides the PKI "as is" to relying parties, limits liability to the extent permitted by law, and publishes relying-party verification instructions (09-using-the-pki.md). Governing law: Commonwealth of Virginia. (To be reviewed by counsel before version 1.0.)

10. Current deviations and transition (v1 generation)

# Statement Current state Fix When
T-01 FIPS 140 Level 3 HSM (§6.2) Cloud HSM is FIPS 140-2 L3 (Historical) Accepted 2026-09-26: build on Cloud HSM; migrate to a FIPS 140-3 HSM by parallel hierarchy when Google validates or a customer requires it (12 §2.1) tracked
T-02 No standing CA-key access (§5.2 item 1) Operator holds owner with sign/destroy on all keys Break-glass account; PAM-only; IAM deny Phase 1
T-03 CA keys disabled between ceremonies Root/intermediate versions enabled Disable after each ceremony Phase 1
T-04 Independent alerts None Log-based alerts to an external address Phase 1
T-05 Locked logs, 2 years BigQuery, unlocked Locked log bucket Phase 1
T-06 CA keys issue only (§1.3) Two CI identities and Harbor can sign with CA keys Signer keys; remove bindings Phase 2
T-07 certificatePolicies, EKU on CAs (§7.1) Absent in v1 Done in v2 (2026-09-26) v2
T-08 TSA policy OID .1.3.1 Sigstore OID Done 2026-09-26 (TSA moved to v2) done
T-09 Root 20 y; Timestamping CA 6 y 25 y; 8 y in v1 Done in v2 v2
T-10 Root/intermediate CRL ≤ 6 months 397 days Next ceremony Phase 1
T-11 OCSP revoked for unknown serials good pki-ocsp change Phase 1
T-12 Witnessed ceremonies v2 ceremony (2026-09-26) witnessed by the Operator only, logged and recorded (pki/ceremonies/2026-09-26-v2.md) External Witness from the next ceremony (G3) next ceremony
T-13 Multi-region keys v1 in us-east1 Done in v2 (location us) v2
T-14 Separate test root None Create Phase 2

History