DRAFT 0.2. Not yet approved. Policy OID 1.3.6.1.4.1.48431.1.1.1. Markdown source: netstable-cp-cps.md.
Document: NetStable CP/CPS, version 0.2 (DRAFT, not
yet in force) Policy document OID:
1.3.6.1.4.1.48431.1.1.1 Owner: NetStable,
LLC, Policy Authority (§1.5) Structure: RFC 3647. A
combined CP (what must be true) and CPS (how NetStable does it). Where
the running PKI does not yet meet a statement, §10 lists the deviation
and its fix; nothing in §10 may be silently dropped.
NetStable, LLC operates a private public-key infrastructure (the NetStable PKI) to sign what it ships: container images and their attestations (SBOM, provenance, vulnerability scans), documents (reports, security notices, release and compliance packages), product licences, and RFC 3161 time-stamps. It is not a publicly trusted CA and does not issue TLS server certificates. Relying parties trust it by explicitly installing the NetStable root (§2.2).
| Item | OID |
|---|---|
| This CP/CPS | 1.3.6.1.4.1.48431.1.1.1 |
| Production HSM signer certificates | 1.3.6.1.4.1.48431.1.2.1 |
| Operator-issued subscriber certificates | 1.3.6.1.4.1.48431.1.2.2 |
| Test / development certificates | 1.3.6.1.4.1.48431.1.2.3 (test root only) |
| TSA policy | 1.3.6.1.4.1.48431.1.3.1 |
| Licence-signing EKU | 1.3.6.1.4.1.48431.1.4.1 |
Arc registry: standards/oid-registry.md (IANA PEN
48431).
Certification authorities. One hierarchy:
NetStable, LLC Root CA v2
└─ NetStable Intermediate CA v2
├─ NetStable Code Signing Issuing CA v2 → image and document signers (everything cosign verifies), short-lived code-signing leaves
├─ NetStable Document Signing Issuing CA v2 → personal document / S-MIME / PDF certificates
├─ NetStable Timestamping Issuing CA v2 → TSA signer
└─ NetStable Licensing Issuing CA v2 → licence signer (ceremony-only)
Generation v2 was created on 2026-09-26. The v1 generation
(NetStable, LLC Root CA v1, "Corporate" and frozen "Heliopolis"
intermediates) remains trusted until its retirement date
(12 §3, Phase 4). OCSP responder certificates are issued by
each issuing CA directly (RFC 6960 §4.2.2.2), so v2 has no separate OCSP
issuing CA.
Registration authority. The Operator (§5.2) performs all registration; there is no separate RA.
Subscribers. (a) NetStable-controlled signers: HSM keys that sign artifacts on behalf of a product; (b) people or systems holding their own key who receive an operator-issued certificate.
Relying parties. Customers, their deployment systems (admission controllers, Harbor), NetStable products verifying licences, and auditors.
| Allowed | Prohibited |
|---|---|
| Signing container images, attestations, documents, packages, licences, time-stamps; personal document signing and S/MIME | TLS server or client authentication; issuing subordinate CAs to anyone but NetStable; any use by a party other than the subscriber |
pki@netstable.io (to be
created) and the IANA PEN contact.https://pki.netstable.io/: CA certificates
(/certs/), signer certificates (/signers/),
CRLs (http://crl.netstable.io/), OCSP
(http://ocsp.netstable.io/), the signed trust manifest and
bundle, Sigstore trusted_root.json and
signing_config.json, verification policies, and
this CP/CPS.https://tsa.netstable.io/api/v1/timestamp:
time-stamping.The root certificate and its SHA-256 fingerprint are published on the repository, in this document (§7.4), and in every product's documentation. Relying parties must verify the fingerprint through a second channel before installing the root.
CA certificates: at ceremony. CRLs of online issuing CAs: at least every 24 hours and on every revocation. CRLs of the root and intermediate: at least every 6 months (§4.9). Manifest: on change and at least every 6 days. This CP/CPS: on each approved version.
Repository content is public read. Only the publishing service identity may write (§5.1).
Subject DNs:
C=US, ST=Virginia, L=Woodbridge, O=NetStable, LLC, OU=<function>, CN=<name>.
Names are meaningful and unique in the hierarchy. Signer certificates
carry the product in the CN (for example "Heliopolis Image Signer v1")
and a SAN URI identity
https://pki.netstable.io/signers/<name>, which
relying parties check. No anonymous or pseudonymous certificates.
Re-key uses a new key or key version and a new certificate; identity is re-validated as in §3.2. Revocation may be requested by the subscriber or the Policy Authority; the Operator authenticates the requester through a known channel.
invalidityDate records when a key is believed compromised,
so signatures time-stamped earlier remain valid. Revocation is effective
in the CRL immediately (online CAs) and in OCSP within 5 minutes.revoked
(RFC 6960 §4.4.8 extended revoked) for serial numbers never issued.tsa.netstable.io issues
RFC 3161/RFC 5816 tokens under policy
1.3.6.1.4.1.48431.1.3.1, SHA-256 or stronger imprints only
(SHA-1 rejected), accuracy ±1 s. The TSA refuses to sign when its clock
disagrees with NIST (UTC(NIST)) by more than 3 s.CA and signer keys live in Cloud HSM (§6.2). The online CA host is a
hardened virtual machine without public web ingress; its APIs are
loopback-only. Public services (repository, CRL, OCSP, TSA) run behind a
managed load balancer with rate limits. All infrastructure is defined in
Terraform and Ansible (terraform/,
ansible/).
| Role | Duties |
|---|---|
| Policy Authority | approves this CP/CPS, new CAs and signers, ceremonies |
| Operator | runs ceremonies, issues and revokes certificates, maintains services |
| Auditor | reviews logs and ceremony records; must not be the Operator |
| Witness | observes and attests ceremonies; holds no key access |
Single-operator exception. NetStable is a single-person organisation. The Policy Authority and Operator roles are held by one person. Multi-person control of CA keys, which industry and federal policies require, is replaced by the following compensating controls, all mandatory:
owner rights sit on a
separate account, whose credentials are split: one part held by the
Operator, one by an external custodian (for example the company's
attorney).DISABLED
and are enabled only inside a ceremony.This exception is reviewed at every yearly CP/CPS review.
Trusted roles are held only by NetStable's managing member or persons under written agreement with NetStable. No background-check requirement beyond that is imposed.
Logged: every Cloud KMS administrative and data-access event
(including every AsymmetricSign), PAM grants, IAM changes,
step-ca issuance and revocation, OCSP and publisher service logs, TSA
requests, ceremony actions. Logs are retained for at least two
years in locked storage; BigQuery holds an analysable copy.
Reviews: automated alerts continuously (§5.2), manual review
quarterly.
Ceremony records, HSM attestations, issued CA and signer certificates, CRLs and this CP/CPS's approved versions are archived until three years after the issuing CA expires, under a retention lock.
Issuing CAs stop issuing at their issuance cut-off (notAfter minus the longest permitted child validity minus 90 days) and are replaced by a new generation created at a ceremony before the cut-off.
invalidityDate
remain valid.At least 90 days' notice on the repository; final CRLs published with
a nextUpdate beyond the last certificate's expiry;
repository kept online until then.
All CA and signer keys are generated inside the HSM and are non-exportable. The HSM's attestation for each key is archived (§5.5). Operator-issued subscriber keys are generated by the subscriber.
us
multi-region location.| Certificate | Validity | Key-use period |
|---|---|---|
| Root | 20 years | issues only intermediate certificates and CRLs, at ceremonies |
| Intermediate | 12 years | issues issuing-CA certificates and CRLs, at ceremonies |
| Code, Document, Licensing Issuing CAs | 8 years | until issuance cut-off (§5.6) |
| Timestamping Issuing CA | 6 years | until issuance cut-off |
| Image and code signers | ≤ 13 months | same; new key version at each renewal |
| Document signers | ≤ 2 years | same |
| Licence signer | ≤ 3 years | same |
| TSA signer certificate | ≤ 90 days | TSA key used ≤ 15 months, then destroyed |
| OCSP responder | ≤ 7 days | same |
| Operator-issued code-signing leaves | ≤ 24 hours | same |
| Operator-issued document / S/MIME | ≤ 1 year | same |
No passwords protect HSM keys; activation is by IAM identity and PAM grant. step-ca provisioner credentials are stored in Secret Manager, readable only by the Operator's privileged role.
Hosts are built from code (Rocky Linux 9, hardened baseline), patched
automatically, with persistent journald and centralised logs. Changes go
through Git review and terraform plan before
apply.
CA APIs listen on loopback only; the CA host has no public web ingress; public services are behind a load balancer with Cloud Armor rate limits.
CA hosts and the TSA use Google infrastructure time; the TSA continuously cross-checks against NIST time servers (§4).
X.509 v3; serial numbers ≥ 64 bits from a CSPRNG, positive, ≤ 20
octets; ECDSA P-384 with SHA-384 (OCSP responders: P-384 from the
rebuild onward); subjectKeyIdentifier per RFC 7093;
authorityKeyIdentifier; CRL distribution point and AIA
(caIssuers, OCSP) over HTTP.
| Certificate | basicConstraints | keyUsage | extendedKeyUsage | certificatePolicies |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Root | CA, (no pathLen) | keyCertSign, cRLSign | — | — |
| Intermediate | CA, pathLen 1 | keyCertSign, cRLSign | serverAuth†, codeSigning, timeStamping, emailProtection,
documentSigning, licensing (.1.4.1) |
.1.2.1, .1.2.2 + CPS URI |
| Code Signing Issuing CA | CA, pathLen 0 | keyCertSign, cRLSign | serverAuth†, codeSigning | .1.2.1, .1.2.2 |
| Document Signing Issuing CA | CA, pathLen 0 | keyCertSign, cRLSign | serverAuth†, documentSigning (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.36),
emailProtection |
.1.2.1, .1.2.2 |
| Timestamping Issuing CA | CA, pathLen 0 | keyCertSign, cRLSign | serverAuth†, timeStamping | .1.2.1 |
| Licensing Issuing CA | CA, pathLen 0 | keyCertSign, cRLSign | 1.3.6.1.4.1.48431.1.4.1 |
.1.2.1 |
| Signers | not CA (critical) | digitalSignature (critical) | per issuing CA | .1.2.1 |
| TSA signer | not CA | digitalSignature | timeStamping only, critical | .1.2.1 |
| Operator-issued leaves | not CA | per template | per template | .1.2.2 |
No CA certificate ever carries OCSPSigning or
anyExtendedKeyUsage. No policy constraints.
† serverAuth and name constraints. Each online
issuing CA runs in step-ca, which serves its API over TLS with a
certificate it issues itself from that CA; standard clients reject that
certificate unless serverAuth is permitted down the chain. serverAuth
therefore appears on the intermediate and the online issuing CAs, and
the intermediate carries critical name constraints
permitting only DNS:localhost, IP:127.0.0.1/32
and IP:::1/128. No CA under the NetStable intermediate can
issue a TLS certificate valid for any real hostname. Signer identities
are URIs, which these constraints do not restrict.
Document and advisory files verified with cosign use signers from the Code Signing CA, because cosign requires the codeSigning purpose; the Document Signing CA serves human-facing signatures (PDF, S/MIME).
X.509 v2 CRLs with CRL number and authority key identifier. Online
issuing CAs: nextUpdate 24 hours, regenerated every 16
hours and on revocation. Root and intermediate: nextUpdate
≤ 6 months, re-signed every 3–5 months at a ceremony.
RFC 6960; delegated responder certificate per issuing CA with
id-pkix-ocsp-nocheck; responses valid ≤ 1 hour for online
CAs; unknown serial numbers answered revoked with the
extended-revoked extension.
| Root | Status | SHA-256 fingerprint |
|---|---|---|
| NetStable, LLC Root CA v2 | current (2026-09-26 → 2046-09-26) | 7b5834c61086dfd79f9402e95579741ff0e3c5f2f3944e3f2453daf1deaf7a83 |
| NetStable, LLC Root CA v1 | trusted until retirement (Phase 4) | 622540676a092c5aaa95a3ec9f07afdbbd34d640d27ca41c17e80584d2f60d72 |
Self-assessment against this CP/CPS at least yearly, plus the
quarterly external log review (§5.2). No WebTrust or ETSI audit (not
required for a private PKI). Findings go to
operations/drift.md.
Certificates are issued at no charge and only for NetStable's own
products and people. NetStable provides the PKI "as is" to relying
parties, limits liability to the extent permitted by law, and publishes
relying-party verification instructions
(09-using-the-pki.md). Governing law: Commonwealth of
Virginia. (To be reviewed by counsel before version 1.0.)
| # | Statement | Current state | Fix | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| T-01 | FIPS 140 Level 3 HSM (§6.2) | Cloud HSM is FIPS 140-2 L3 (Historical) | Accepted 2026-09-26: build on Cloud HSM; migrate to a FIPS 140-3 HSM
by parallel hierarchy when Google validates or a customer requires it
(12 §2.1) |
tracked |
| T-02 | No standing CA-key access (§5.2 item 1) | Operator holds owner with sign/destroy on all keys |
Break-glass account; PAM-only; IAM deny | Phase 1 |
| T-03 | CA keys disabled between ceremonies | Root/intermediate versions enabled | Disable after each ceremony | Phase 1 |
| T-04 | Independent alerts | None | Log-based alerts to an external address | Phase 1 |
| T-05 | Locked logs, 2 years | BigQuery, unlocked | Locked log bucket | Phase 1 |
| T-06 | CA keys issue only (§1.3) | Two CI identities and Harbor can sign with CA keys | Signer keys; remove bindings | Phase 2 |
| T-07 | certificatePolicies, EKU on CAs (§7.1) | Absent in v1 | Done in v2 (2026-09-26) | v2 |
| T-08 | TSA policy OID .1.3.1 |
Sigstore OID | Done 2026-09-26 (TSA moved to v2) | done |
| T-09 | Root 20 y; Timestamping CA 6 y | 25 y; 8 y in v1 | Done in v2 | v2 |
| T-10 | Root/intermediate CRL ≤ 6 months | 397 days | Next ceremony | Phase 1 |
| T-11 | OCSP revoked for unknown serials |
good |
pki-ocsp change | Phase 1 |
| T-12 | Witnessed ceremonies | v2 ceremony (2026-09-26) witnessed by the Operator only, logged and
recorded (pki/ceremonies/2026-09-26-v2.md) |
External Witness from the next ceremony (G3) | next ceremony |
| T-13 | Multi-region keys | v1 in us-east1 | Done in v2 (location us) |
v2 |
| T-14 | Separate test root | None | Create | Phase 2 |